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CASES NOTED
OUTMODED IMPACT RULE RETAINED BY FLORIDA
While lying awake in bed, plaintiff heard the sound of a car striking
her residence following a two car collision at an intersection. She allegedly
suffered fright that led to an immediate heart attack and a subsequent
stroke. In her suit, plaintiff asserted that her physical injuries were proxi-
mately caused by both drivers' negligence, but the trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants since plaintiff failed to allege
impact. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed and re-
manded the case for trial, declaring that the time had come to eliminate
impact as a prerequisite to recovery for physical consequences of mental
disturbances.' At a rehearing the district court certified the question to
the supreme court.2 On conflict certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida
quashed the decision of the district court with directions to reinstate the
trial court's summary judgment and held: Where a plaintiff suffers an
objective physical injury as a result of emotional stress induced by al-
legedly negligent conduct, no action may be maintained in the absence of
some impact upon the person of the plaintiff. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.
2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
There is probably no more confused area of tort law than that deal-
ing with recovery for the physical consequences of negligently inflicted
mental disturbance.' Based on the erroneous belief that "normal" people
do not suffer physical injuries as a natural consequence of fright,4 the
early decisions denied recovery for the physical consequences of fright
where the plaintiff had not suffered any impact from the negligent act.5
Later cases gradually relaxed the amount of impact required' in an effort
to do justice until the requisite impact was reduced to an absurdity.
7
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions, including Florida,8 persisted in retain-
ing the impact rule as a hedge against a feared plethora of fraudulent law-
suits9 despite a deluge of dissent from numerous legal theorists."°
1. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
2. Id.
3. See 38 AM. JuR. 2d Fright, Shock, Etc. § 13 (1968).
4. E.g., Ward v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
6. E.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (slight
blow); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272
(1929) (a trifling burn); Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-operative, 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1958) (electric shock) ; Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation
of smoke).
7. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (horse evacu-
ates bowels on lap).
8. See Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
9. The three most common arguments offered in support of the impact rule are (1)
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A keen awareness of the injustice being dispensed to the honest
plaintiff who failed to allege a nominal impact 1 plus an improved under-
standing of medical causation finally convinced some courts to replace
the requirement of impact with a zone-of-danger concept.' 2 That is, the
plaintiff did not have to be touched but did have to be located where the
defendant owed him a duty of due care.' 8 It soon became apparent that
the feared flood of fraudulent litigation did not materialize, 14 and the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have now abandoned the impact
rule.15
The earliest apparent application of the impact rule in Florida was
International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders," involving mental pain
and suffering resulting from the negligent delivery of a telegram. In a
two-to-one decision, 17 the Florida Supreme Court adopted the conserva-
tive view that mental pain was not an element of damages, despite the
fact that a majority of other jurisdictions passing on the question had
already reached contrary results on similar facts.'" Along with other states
explicitly retaining the impact rule,' 9 Florida has minimized the degree of
impact required to sustain a recovery ° and created an exception to the
impact requirement where malice can be implied.
21
Several recent district court of appeal decisions 22 suggested a willing-
the difficulty in proving causation between the claimed damages and the alleged mental dis-
turbance, (2) a fear of fraudulent lawsuits, and (3) a fear that the absence of an impact
rule would produce a vast increase in litigation.
10. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicE. L. Rzv. 497 (1922);
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033
(1936); Harper and McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional
Distress, [1938] Wis. L. Rxv. 426; Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30
VA. L. Rxv. 193 (1944); Note, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 540 (1964).
11. In a highly readable, yet scorching denunciation of the illogic of the impact rule,
Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid bare the fallacies of this doctrine
with his dissenting opinion in Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
12. E.g., Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
13. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.,
[1925] K.B. 141.
14. See cases cited at note 12 supra.
15. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143 (1959). There appear to be only eight jurisdictions,
including Florida, explicitly retaining the impact rule. See note 19 infra.
16. 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893).
17. In 1893 the Florida Supreme Court consisted of only three justices.
18. International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893).
Justice Mabry, dissenting, said: "a decided majority of the American state courts have held
the [telegraph] company liable .... " Id. at 450, 14 So. at 153.
19. Ark.: St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Ill.:
Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898); Ind.: Boston v. Chesapeake & O.R.R.,
223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945); Ky.: Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's
Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929); Mass.: Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341
Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960); Mo.: Gambill v. White, 303 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957);
Ohio.: Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
20. Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958).
21. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
22. Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc., 271 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). In Johnson,
the court certified the impact question to the Florida Supreme Court, which reversed in a
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ness on the part of some Florida courts to abandon the impact require-
ment, but in the instant case, the supreme court has reaffirmed the rule.
In so doing, it chastised the Fourth District 3 for attempting to overrule
prior supreme court decisions. Retired Justice Drew, speaking for the
majority, said "[w] e do not agree that, especially under the facts in this
case, there is any valid justification to recede from the long standing deci-
sions of this Court in this area. '24 The majority opinion then adopted
the view held by dissenting Judge Reed of the Fourth District, who had
declared that
there is more underlying the impact doctrine than simply prob-
lems of proof, fraudulent claims, and excessive litigation. The
impact doctrine gives practical recognition to the thought that
not every injury which one person may by his negligence inflict
upon another should be compensated in money damages. There
must be some level of harm which one should absorb without
recompense as the price he pays for living in an organized so-
ciety.
25
The brief majority opinion offered no additional reasons for refusing to
abandon the impact doctrine.
Thus, the majority failed to reach the merits of either the district
court's opinion,26 or the elucidation thereof by dissenting Supreme Court
Justice Adkins.27 Although complimenting the district court for an able
argument,28 the majority simply ignored the fact that the lower court
demolished all logic and reason for retaining the rule.29 Worse, since the
plaintiff eventually succumbed as a result of her injuries,30 the supreme
court seems to be saying that, absent impact, a Florida plaintiff must ac-
cept death as the "level of harm which one should absorb without recom-
pense as the price he pays for living in an organized society,"'31 when the
harm is the result of negligently inflicted mental disturbance.
This proposition is patently absurd. It directly conflicts with the
Florida Constitution, which provides that Florida courts are to provide
companion decision to the instant case, Herlong Aviation, Inc. v. Johnson, 291 So. 2d 603
(Fla. 1974). Hoffie v. Radcliffe, 200 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) (dictum); Way v.
Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) (a contract action).
23. 291 So. 2d at 594. The court said "the greater question . . . is the action of the
majority below in openly overruling previous decisions of this Court. The constitutional sys-
tem of courts in this State contemplates that only the Supreme Court may overrule its own
decisions."
24. Id. at 595.
25. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (emphasis added).
26. Stewart v. Giliiam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
27. 291 So. 2d at 596.
28. Id. at 595.
29. See note 9 supra. The district court systematically rebutted each of the reasons pre-
viously offered in support of the rule. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 472-77 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1972).
30. Id. at 468 n.1.
31. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
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every person with a remedy by due course of law.8 2 The Florida Supreme
Court itself has long adhered to the rule "that for every legal wrong there
is a remedy and that every litigant is entitled to have his cause submitted
to the arbitrament of the law."83
Dissenting Justice Adkins amplified and clarified 4 the well rea-
soned 5 district court opinion in a thorough analysis of the law in this
field. The dissent recounted the history of the rule from its origin8 and
rapid demise87 in England, described the adoption of the rule in the
United States,8" outlined some of the major cases in other jurisdictions
overthrowing the rule,8" and traced the development and application of
the rule in Florida." Justice Adkins then noted that the rule had been
eroded through the years by affirming the rule itself, but allowing re-
coveries.4 In discussing Lyng v. Rao42 and Clark v. Choctawhatchee
Electric Co-operative,48 Adkins said:
recovery was allowed without testimony of impact where the
facts, together with the genuineness of the injury, demonstrated
that there must have been an impact even though the plaintiff
may not have been conscious of it. Therefore, we continued to
pay homage to the impact requirement by indulgency in a legal
fiction and implying impact. It is now time to "tell it like it is."44
The dissent agreed with the district court's rebuttal of each of the
three usual arguments 4 made in defense of the impact rule, and declared
32. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
33. Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 475 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Tidwell v.
Witherspoon, 21 Fla. 359 (1885).
34. Two questions were answered that had not been adequately dealt with in the dis-
trict court decision: (1) how much physical injury must there be to permit a recovery, and
(2) whether the plaintiff must be in the zone of danger.
35. The lower court had faced the question of contrary precedents by pointing out that
the rule of stare decisis is meant to give the law stability, not to petrify it. Stewart v.
Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 471-72 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The district court quoted from and
adopted the rationale of a number of the recent decisions in other jurisdictions. Id. at 472-
77. See cases cited at note 39 infra.
36. Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
37. Coyle v. John Watson, Ltd., [1915] A.C. 1.
38. Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Haile's Curator
v. Texas & Pac. R.R., 60 F. 557 (5th Cir. 1894); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,
45 N.E. 354 (1896). See also Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
39. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) ; Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 397 S.W.2d
409 (1965) ; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
40. International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893);
Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188
(Fla. 1950); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec.
Co-op., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958).
41. 291 So. 2d at 601.
42. 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
43. 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1958).
44. 291 So. 2d at 601.
45. See notes 9 and 29 supra.
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that "[i]t is apparent from [the district court] opinion that the reasons
for the rule no longer exist.
' 46
The district court carefully limited its analysis to cases involving
physical injuries resulting from a mental disturbance.47 Justice Adkins
adopted that view and suggested that five further limitations were neces-
sary for "clarity" in rejecting the impact rule:4S
(1) A substantial physical injury must be shown.49 (2) Re-
covery should not be permitted unless the plaintiff was in the
area of physical risk (or "zone of danger"), presumably so
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of due care. (3)
The resultant physical injury should follow as a natural result of
fright."° (4) No recovery should be permitted for "hypersensi-
tive mental disturbance"," in excess of that which would afflict
a normal person under the circumstances. (5) Injuries which
will sustain a recovery "should not only be proximately caused
by negligence of the defendant, but should also follow closely
in point of time to the negligent conduct.... 52
The dissenting opinion is a commendable and convincing appeal for
moderation of Florida's regressive position on the impact question, but
it, too, has a weakness. Justice Adkins really advocates replacing one
arbitrary limit on recovery with another. Why allow recovery for physi-
cal consequences of mental disturbance, but not for the mental distur-
bance itself?5" A careful reading of both the Fourth District opinion and
the Adkins dissent shows that their arguments against the impact rule
could have been used to urge recovery for mental disturbance alone, as-
suming the mental injury is "substantial and manifested by objective
symptomatology." 54 While such symptoms may, in fact, be regarded by
some jurisdictions as the consequent physical injuries in a worthy case, a
truly modern approach demands acceptance of objectively ascertainable
traumatic neurosis55 as a compensable injury when proximate cause can
46. 291 So. 2d at 602.
47. The court said, "we are not herein concerned with any action for recovery for
mental or emotional disturbance unconnected with a resulting physical injury." Stewart v.
Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466, 472 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (emphasis in original).
48. 291 So. 2d at 602-03.
49. Justice Adkins approved the test in Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569, 214 A.2d
12, 17 (1965).
50. The test proposed in Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 13, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (1970)
was offered.
51. 291 So. 2d at 603.
52. Id.
53. The courts repeatedly assert the capability of our judicial system to separate merito-
rious from fraudulent claims with the aid of modern medical science. See, e.g., Lyng v.
Rao, 72 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1954); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 12, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395
(1970).
54. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970).
55. Traumatic neurosis is neurosis following an accident experience with only minor or
no physical impact. 3 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES § 20.1 (rev. vol. 1970).
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be established. 56 The trend is certainly in that direction.57 The language
of precedent written when medical knowledge was far more limited should
not petrify the law.5 8 Rather, the courts should recognize that they al-
ready have the tools to separate fact from fraud.5"
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court apparently never con-
sidered either the advancing frontiers of science or the trend in other
jurisdictions. Instead, the court decided, without explanation, not to shift
to the tortfeasor some of the price of living in an urban society that is of-
ten placed on the injured person.
ROBERT J. VAN DER WALL
GASOLINE DEALERS' REMEDIES AGAINST
DEALERSHIP TERMINATION
Marinello entered into a lease and dealer agreement with appellant
Shell Oil Company. The contracts were executed simultaneously, to run
for identical three year primary periods and were renewable thereafter
from year to year. The lease was terminable by Marinello at any time
upon 90 days notice, at the end of the primary period or at the end of the
subsequent year. Either party could terminate the dealer contract at any
time by giving ten days notice. Shell Oil Company gave notice of termi-
nation and brought suit for possession of the premises. The suit was
consolidated with Marinello's action seeking injunctive relief and reforma-
tion of the agreements. The trial court granted reformation,1 to include
an implied covenant by appellant to renew the agreements so long as re-
spondent substantially performed his obligations thereunder.' On direct
certification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, held, modified and af-
56. Id. at §§ 20.2, 52.
57. Id. at § 20.53.
58. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). See also
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148-59 (1930).
59. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
1. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Ch. Div. 1972).
2. Marinello's principal obligations under the lease (prepared by Shell Oil Co.) were:
(1) to pay rent; (2) to furnish a security deposit; (3) to keep the station open twenty-four
hours a day, subject to local ordinance; (4) to keep the station clean and in good repair;
and (5) to use the premises only for the operation of a service station. Shell agreed to sell
Shell gasoline and products, and to license respondent to use Shell's trademarks, brand-
names and identifications. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 358, 294 A.2d
253, 257-58 (Ch. Div. 1972).
In the trial court, Shell contended that Marinello had failed to perform obligations three
and four. Marinello's evidence indicated knowledge and acquiescence by Shell in his devia-
tions from the specified business hours. He also produced evidence that the station was clean
and well run. The supreme court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent had sub-
stantially complied with his obligations. Id. at 378-82, 307 A.2d at 603.
